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 David S. Yost
 FRANCE IN THE NEW EUROPE
 T JLhe remarkable developments in Europe since late
 1989?German unification, the collapse of communism in
 Eastern Europe and the expectation of large-scale withdrawals
 of Soviet and American forces?have upset long-standing
 assumptions of French security policy. Stable reference points
 have been displaced by new risks and uncertainties. Past
 preoccupations about the future of Russia, Germany and
 Europe's political order and institutions have become more
 pressing and more acute.
 Despite internal political problems, French officials are at
 tempting to devise policies that would reconcile competing na
 tional aims. But the international developments of the past year
 may make it increasingly difficult for French politicians to main
 tain the national consensus on defense that has coalesced since
 the late 1970s. Official assertions of confidence in the comple
 mentarity and coherence of France's policies appear to mask
 important unresolved dilemmas and underlying anxieties.
 Since the 1960s, French security policy has been based on
 the following premises:
 ?a large U.S. nuclear and conventional force presence in
 West Germany, as part of an extensive integrated alliance
 structure, providing a de facto forward glacis for France's
 protection;
 ?a West Germany anchored in nato, dependent on allied
 security commitments and particularly interested in ob
 taining French cooperation regarding West European
 economic integration, and within and outside other mul
 tilateral political, economic and military institutions; and
 ?a stable and predictable framework of East-West relations
 in which France could maintain a special status with
 respect to nato's integrated military structure, emphasiz
 ing its independence, autonomy and freedom of action.
 On the basis of these premises, General Charles de Gaulle
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 pursued during his presidency (1958-69) policy objectives that
 were already discernible during the Fourth Republic (1946
 58) and established what has remained France's basic security
 posture since its withdrawal in 1966 from nato's integrated
 military structure. De Gaulle's legacy has provided the touch
 stone for consensus on French security policy since the late
 1970s, when the Socialists endorsed the maintenance of an
 independent nuclear deterrent posture.
 De Gaulle's design ultimately amounted to France having
 two policies for security in Europe: one of cooperation with
 nato allies; the other of independence, based on national
 assets, including nuclear forces and a robust military-industrial
 establishment. It has become customary in France to speak of
 "three circles." The first circle consists of the national "sanc
 tuary" protected by France's nuclear forces; the second is
 comprised of France's defense responsibilities in Europe; and
 the third extends overseas, to French commitments in Africa
 and other distant territories and interests. The three circles,
 along with France's duty to uphold its rank ("the third military
 power" in the world, in President Fran?ois Mitterrand's words)
 and independence through its own nuclear deterrent forces,
 have constituted the bedrock of the nation's defense consen
 sus.
 This Gaullist approach to security policy and the consensus
 behind it have been so successful in domestic and international
 politics that French leaders have been inclined to try to
 maintain as much of it as possible. Never has it been so clear,
 however, that France's policies of independence have been
 largely dependent on advantageous international circum
 stances. Now, given the prospect of a diminished U.S. military
 and nuclear presence in Western Europe, a less stable and
 predictable situation throughout east-central and south-east
 Europe and the U.S.S.R., and uncertainty concerning the
 internal political dynamics and policies of a unified Germany,
 a number of factors supporting France's privileged and
 unique security position may disappear. As Defense Minister
 Jean-Pierre Chev?nement put it in June 1990, the "decoloni
 zation of the last empire"?that of the Soviet Union?repre
 sents "a leap into the unknown for all Europeans, who have to
 organize their security relations on a radically new basis."1
 1 Speech at the Royal United Services Institute, London, June 7, 1990, in the French
 Ministry of Defense compilation, Propos sur la D?fense, May-June 1990, p. 105.
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 It is now commonplace in France, as it is elsewhere in the
 West, to consider the Soviet Union incapable of recapturing its
 past position of dominance in Eastern Europe without large
 scale military interventions of a kind that seem most improb
 able, if not inconceivable, at the present juncture. It is also
 assumed that the Warsaw Pact is no longer a plausible or
 reliable alliance; that the Soviets will honor commitments to
 withdraw their forces from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East
 Germany; that all Soviet forces will be out of Eastern Europe
 by the mid-1990s; and that communist movements will remain
 thoroughly discredited throughout the region, even if the
 road to democracy is an arduous one.
 Several French officials continue to point out, however, that
 even if the Warsaw Pact should completely disintegrate?it
 only exists now for some, perhaps transient, political consul
 tation purposes?and even if the Soviet Union should break
 apart, the Russian republic alone would still remain the single
 greatest military power in Europe; it does not need an empire
 to be the first power on the continent. (Russia's population is
 more than 150 million and its territory thirty times that of
 France.) Even if Soviet armed forces were cut in half, they
 would still be by far the greatest in Europe. In Defense
 Minister Chev?nement's view, moreover, the geostrategic sit
 uation of several countries?Poland, Bulgaria and Romania?
 is such that "they will not leave the Russian sphere of influence
 as quickly as some imagine."
 Many French policymakers believe therefore that Russia's
 power must still be balanced with vigilance by the West. Paris
 agrees with other Western governments that movements in the
 U.S.S.R. toward democratization, economic liberalization and
 a peaceful settlement of nationalities issues should be encour
 aged. Some French officials have been unusually explicit,
 however, in warning that dangerous internal upheavals and
 policy reversals in the Soviet Union cannot be excluded,
 perhaps including an attempt at revanchism. Because Soviet
 military power is still viewed as "very considerable," and
 Mikhail Gorbachev's future is seen as unpredictable, Mitter
 rand has warned that "nothing can guarantee that a new Soviet
 power?which might not be communist?wouldn't still be
 military and totalitarian. And that would be a great danger."
 The outcome of the internal turmoil in the U.S.S.R. and
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 Eastern Europe remains so unpredictable that Paris feels it
 must maintain and modernize the key elements of its military
 posture, resist any hasty and unwarranted weakening of the
 Atlantic alliance, and continue to press for a deepening of
 economic and political integration in the European Commu
 nity, as well as closer and more substantive security cooper
 ation in Western Europe.
 These prescriptions are consistent with the thrust of French
 security policy during the 1980s and underscore a certain
 undercurrent of mutual suspicion in Franco-Soviet relations.
 A number of French analysts have noted that France could
 become Russia's principal adversary in Europe; France has
 taken a leading role in resisting the denuclearization of Eu
 rope and in organizing West European defense and security
 cooperation.2 Some French observers hypothesize that the
 Soviets are trying to capitalize on their own political and
 economic weakness, including their prospective withdrawal
 from Eastern Europe, by depressing public and parliamentary
 perceptions of the U.S.S.R.'s military potential, thereby dis
 couraging the maintenance of Western security structures.
 The "preparing for the worst" theme regarding Eastern
 Europe and the Soviet Union has nonetheless been far less
 prominent in French policy articulations and initiatives than
 that of "encouraging the best." The French agree with their
 nato allies and ec partners that Western security could be
 strengthened in the long term through a successful program
 for democratization and economic prosperity in the nations of
 Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.
 Toward this end, President Mitterrand and German Chan
 cellor Helmut Kohl have joined in urging their Western
 partners to provide immediate economic aid to the Soviet
 Union. Mitterrand has insisted that Gorbachev deserves sup
 port and dismissed the "reform first" position of Britain, the
 United States and other countries as another version of the
 chicken-and-egg riddle. But the French government's motives
 in this regard appear to include considerations beyond simply
 promoting economic and political reform in the Soviet Union.
 Above all, France is profoundly interested in having a com
 mon policy with Germany and, somewhat paradoxically, in
 2 See for example Henri Paris, "La France, ennemi principal de l'URSS en Europe?"
 D?fense Nationale, January 1988, pp. 51-64. General Paris is currently the director of the
 D?l?gation aux Etudes G?n?rales in the Ministry of Defense.
This content downloaded from 205.155.65.226 on Fri, 02 Mar 2018 18:39:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 FRANCE IN THE NEW EUROPE 111
 competing with the Germans for privileged relations with
 Moscow.
 in
 France's determination to compete for influence in the
 Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reflects but one of the many
 French preoccupations and anxieties regarding Germany in
 the new Europe. Before 1989 the French had implicitly
 assumed, like almost everyone else, that German unification
 would remain a remote possibility, due to seemingly perma
 nent Soviet policy imperatives. Although for over thirty years
 France had officially supported German unification?many
 French leaders had called for ''overcoming Yalta"?
 throughout the same period its security policy assumed the
 stability of the East-West division of Germany and of Europe.
 Even after the Berlin Wall was opened in November 1989,
 Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and Defense Minister Chev
 ?nement initially insisted that German unification was "not a
 current issue."
 As it became evident that this judgment was mistaken,
 French politicians and analysts began to recognize that the
 postwar political and security arrangements, by postponing
 any resolution of the German question, had elevated France's
 status and influence in Europe. The likely consequences of
 German unity and Soviet retreat could then include, in Pierre
 Lellouche's pungent words, "an economically superpowerful
 Germany, politically dominant in central Europe, and a France
 reduced to a secondary role; an end to Gaullist dreams of a
 Europe directed politically by a nuclear France."3
 These anxieties are apparent not only in the remarkably
 explicit expressions of concern made by French commentators
 and high-level officials, but also in their many efforts to
 reassure the French public and to dismiss "absurd fears."
 Dumas and others have offered reasons why France should
 not have an "inferiority complex" in relation to Germany, and
 have called attention to the democratic history of the Federal
 Republic of Germany and its commitment to nato and the EC.
 Some have discerned risks in French public perceptions of a
 France with diminished status and influence in Europe. In
 conjunction with an impression of "too confident" or "arro
 3 "Cette grande Allemagne qui inqui?te," Le Point, March 5, 1990, p. 44.
This content downloaded from 205.155.65.226 on Fri, 02 Mar 2018 18:39:04 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 112 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
 gant" an attitude on Germany's part, such perceptions could
 lead to less friendly bilateral relations than those of recent
 years.
 French anxieties about Germany have been unfortunately
 aggravated by a series of irritations in the Paris-Bonn relation
 ship. Some French politicians and commentators have ex
 pressed consternation over various decisions made by West
 Germany without?from the French perspective?adequate
 consultation with Paris or Bonn's other partners. Among these
 are Kohl's announcement in November 1989 of a 10-point
 plan for German unity, of which Paris was not even informed
 in advance; the granting of economic and monetary union to
 East Germany; the announcement of a special military status
 for East German territory and a ceiling on the Bundeswehr,
 the latter determined directly between Kohl and Gorbachev in
 their July 1990 summit; to say nothing of Kohl's protracted
 and awkward hedging over Germany's officially recognizing
 the Oder-Neisse border with Poland.
 Bonn, too, has had a number of reasons for annoyance
 with Paris. Mitterrand's December 1989 trip to East Berlin,
 made at the invitation of East German leader Erich Hon
 ecker, seemed intended to lend legitimacy and staying power
 to the East German state. Earlier that month Mitterrand went
 to Kiev and, perhaps unintentionally, conveyed the impres
 sion that he wished to encourage the Soviets to block or delay
 German unification. As it became increasingly apparent that
 unification was inevitable, French officials then began com
 piling lists of "conditions" that would make the fact accept
 able: above all, the process of unification would have to be
 "democratic and peaceful"; Germany would have to remain
 committed to nato and further ec economic and political
 integration; it would have to renounce permanently nuclear,
 chemical and biological weapons; and it would have to make
 clear its permanent acceptance of existing frontiers, includ
 ing the Oder-Neisse line. Although the uncertainties sur
 rounding the frontiers issue initially derived from Kohl's
 politically and legalistically inspired temporizing about the
 difficulties of definitively settling the question prior to formal
 unification, opinion polls showed that most Germans had no
 interest in changing these frontiers. For many Germans,
 then, emphatic French statements of solidarity with Poland
 appeared to amount to gratuitous posturing at Germany's
 expense.
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 IV
 French ambivalence about German unification has included
 several vaguely defined and, in some cases, contradictory
 anxieties regarding security implications. A primary concern
 for some is the possible political devaluation of French military
 assets. French military contributions to German security may
 become less important in an era of d?tente, arms control,
 diminished threat perceptions and large-scale Soviet force
 withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Additionally, the intrinsic
 potential of a united Germany to provide for its own defense,
 and thus its enhanced capacity for military autonomy, would
 seem to diminish France's security role in the new Europe.
 The lessened significance of France's nuclear and military
 posture could in turn reinforce Germany's political primacy, in
 that Germany's economic superiority and influence would no
 longer be balanced by a high level of dependence on an
 alliance security framework.
 A more substantive concern is the fear of a "strategic
 vacuum" in central Europe. In July 1990, Chev?nement put it
 this way:
 A strategic vacuum is going to open up in a few years at the heart of
 Europe, both conventional and nuclear. . . . The Soviet Union will remain,
 by force of circumstances, a military superpower. . . . But, to the West, the
 conjunction of the American withdrawal and the spiral of disarmament
 started unilaterally by the countries of Western Europe will inevitably
 create an imbalance. Germany, entirely preoccupied with bringing about its
 unity and taking the necessary steps for that, has not only just accepted a
 self-imposed limit on its forces, but Chancellor Kohl has officially an
 nounced ... his support for a double-zero option [that is, neither nuclear
 artillery nor missiles on German soil]. ... Is this a stable situation for the
 long term? To raise the question is to answer it.4
 Some French observers judge that, even if Kohl and his
 coalition partners remain in office after all-German elections
 in December 1990, German leaders are likely to insist that full
 sovereignty and the "normalization" of Germany's status re
 quire the elimination of most, if not all, foreign military forces
 and nuclear weapons, including nuclear weapons based on
 aircraft.
 A related risk perceived by some in France is the prospect of
 German unification leading to a demilitarization and neutral
 4 Interview in Le Monde, July 13, 1990, pp. 1, 9.
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 ization of central Europe. Such a development would place
 France on the front line of a potentially dangerous power
 vacuum?an "empty" zone of military weakness and possible
 instability?that could invite Russian attempts at the coercion
 of Germany and other countries. These "strategic vacuum"
 fears imply, in other words, that many or all of the main
 military elements of the nato glacis between France and
 Russia could vanish relatively quickly.
 The unpredictability of future German security policy is also
 a major concern. Some French analysts have noted that the
 internal political dynamics of the new Germany may be rather
 incalculable, because the variables include the addition of 16
 million East Germans to the Federal Republic and a pro
 longed, absorbing and, paradoxically, potentially divisive pro
 cess of economic and social unification. This is to say nothing
 of the rapidly shifting international political context surround
 ing the German metamorphosis. As a result, some French
 observers fear that no one can guarantee Germany's continued
 or unchanged participation in nato, or the sort of alliance
 policies the new nation will pursue. It is then a short step from
 the possibility of German neutrality to other scenarios: an
 assertive and distinctively nationalistic military policy; an at
 tempt to organize a Mitteleuropa security zone under German
 hegemony; and/or a decision by Germany in the middle or late
 1990s to develop its own nuclear weapons.
 Another widely voiced fear is that France and other Atlantic
 alliance countries might fail in their efforts to keep Germany
 fully in the West. The concern is that Germany might follow
 an increasingly independent course in its relations with the
 Soviet Union, or even agree to a German-Russian entente or
 condominium based on Russian military power and German
 economic strength and technical expertise. French politicians
 and commentators on both the left and right have pointed to
 this possibility, with references to Rapallo, the Hitler-Stalin
 pact and other historical precedents.
 Chev?nement recently alluded to such precedents as char
 acteristic of a historical pattern in German-Russian relations,
 declaring "the rebalancing between these two powers, readily
 expansionist, one to the detriment of the other when their
 respective weight is too unequal, can lead in the following
 period to a sort of entente; there is between these two peoples
 an old connivance, which has known many forms." In the
 present context, Chev?nement added, one cannot exclude a
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 German-Russian "competition for influence in central Europe,
 perhaps accompanied by a sharing of roles." The outcome, in
 Chev?nement's view, depends largely on Soviet efforts at
 economic modernization and the evolution of German public
 opinion.5
 If central Europe were to be organized under German or
 joint German-Russian direction, some French observers have
 concluded, France would soon become politically isolated,
 marginalized and subject to pressures for cooperation with the
 new leadership of Europe. Such commentaries convey an
 impression of France's relative vulnerability; both Germany
 and Russia are greater powers than France, and new alliances
 or rivalries involving these two countries and their neighbors
 could be highly dangerous, especially in a period of substantial
 U.S. military disengagement from Europe. French observers
 note that Kohl negotiated the July 16, 1990, agreement on
 German membership in nato directly with Gorbachev, mak
 ing the "two plus four" negotiations seem like a pro forma
 framework of secondary importance.
 France's official policy aims to make the fulfillment of any of
 these fears as remote and improbable as possible. Paris intends
 to cultivate relations of confidence with the new Germany, to
 champion Germany's membership in the Atlantic alliance and
 to accelerate the economic, monetary and political union of the
 EC. There exists nonetheless a certain feeling of vulnerability
 and, in some quarters, even helplessness among those who
 judge that France will be subject to unpredictable German
 choices, choices that will determine the future of nato, the ec
 and other institutions, and over which France may have rather
 limited influence. This sentiment of uncertainty and vulnera
 bility currently conditions France's approach to the future of
 European political and security institutions.
 v
 French officials usually describe their aims for Europe's
 future political and security order in tactful abstract formula
 tions. Dumas, for example, has suggested that it is imperative
 "to organize Europe so that it escapes the two perils of
 hegemony or explosion . . . [with] a better-assured security, a
 will to solidarity." In institutional terms, he adds, the move
 5 Speech at the Institut des Hautes Etudes de D?fense Nationale, Paris, May 21, 1990, in
 Propos sur la D?fense, op. cit., pp. 50-52.
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 ment of the ec toward political union should include a "Euro
 pean identity in the domain of security," but within the
 Atlantic alliance, a goal approved at the July 1990 nato
 summit. The foundation for such an order would consist of
 the ec, supplemented by Mitterrand's proposed European
 Confederation?the ec, East European countries unable to
 qualify for ec membership, and others?and finally the Con
 ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (csce), which
 includes Canada and the United States, both termed "indis
 pensable for the maintenance of the balance of forces in
 Europe."6
 The French purposes behind these institutional arrange
 ments appear to include the following:
 ?to maintain as much as possible of France's established
 security posture, including autonomy and freedom of
 action;
 ?to sustain France's leadership role in Western Europe,
 particularly in the ec;
 ?to keep Germany fully committed to the ec, the Atlantic
 alliance and other Western institutions;
 ?to maintain U.S. commitments to the Atlantic alliance,
 even as the U.S. force presence in Europe is reduced;
 ?to encourage a stable process of democratic political
 reform and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe
 and the Soviet Union;
 ?to maintain a balance of power while preserving means of
 dialogue and negotiation, in order to prevent Moscow
 from feeling isolated; and finally,
 ?to protect the ec from the dilution and loss of momentum
 that enlargement would cause at the present juncture.
 The French have discreetly revealed profound skepticism
 regarding the enthusiasm of some Germans, including For
 eign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and many Social Dem
 ocrats, for "transcending" or "absorbing" the Atlantic alliance
 and the Warsaw Pact and replacing them with a "collective
 security" arrangement based on the csce. According to pro
 ponents of this design, alliances and other "balance of power"
 dispositions tend to divide countries, to promote "enemy
 images" and arms competitions, and to prolong international
 6 Dumas speech to French Senate, June 27, 1990, in the Foreign Ministry's Bulletin d'
 Information, June 28; Dumas interview in Le Figaro, July 25, 1990, reproduced in Bulletin
 d Information, July 25.
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 misunderstandings and antagonisms. The 35 members of the
 csce should, it is argued, guarantee each other's security in a
 comprehensive system in which all are committed to unite
 against any aggressor.
 Many in France and elsewhere suspect, however, that in
 practice a collective security system based on the csce would
 not reliably guarantee anyone's security. Given the csce's
 unwieldy size, its unanimity rule in decision making and its
 other shortcomings, such an arrangement could prove as
 unsatisfactory a basis for security as did the League of Nations
 in the 1920s and 1930s. It is not surprising that official French
 statements have expressed caution about any near-term "insti
 tutionalization" of the csce beyond a small secretariat, regu
 larly scheduled high-level meetings and other measures to
 promote confidence, transparency and crisis-prevention.
 VI
 While France has been clear on the need to carefully
 calibrate security cooperation measures in the csce frame
 work, inconsistencies and uncertainties have been apparent in
 its efforts to maintain its own special status in nato's integrated
 military structure, to retain U.S. commitments and forces in
 Europe, and to promote closer West European security coop
 eration.
 Without much specificity as to concrete arrangements, the
 French continue to hold that it would be, in Mitterrand's
 words, "wise and useful for the Europeans in the future to
 prepare themselves to play an increased role in the alliance for
 their own defense." The essential vision has been of a stronger
 and more autonomous West European defense posture cen
 tered around close Franco-German relations. European de
 pendence on the United States would be diminished, not
 eliminated, and the Atlantic alliance framework maintained.
 Chev?nement indicated in London in June 1990 that the U.S.
 commitment to European security "remains indispensable . . .
 [to serve as] the counter-weight to the military power, nuclear
 and conventional, of the U.S.S.R." But it is necessary, he
 argues, to think about "new modalities for the American
 presence in Europe. ... It is clear that notions of reinforce
 ment, C3 [command, control and communications], and air
 defense will take on increased importance in a context in
 which U.S. ground forces stationed in Europe are reduced."
 French officials have made it clear, however, that these "new
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 modalities" cannot include American installations in France.
 The basing of any foreign forces on French soil is likely to
 remain politically problematic. The absence of foreign forces,
 except for some West German logistic sites and during certain
 military exercises, has been established since 1966?67 as an
 indication of France's special status and independence in
 nato. Fears of more far-reaching U.S. force withdrawals may
 eventually prompt France to pursue deeper bilateral security
 cooperation and to encourage its allies to continue to welcome
 U.S. forces. An American military presence in France, how
 ever, would represent a profound change in established poli
 cies and attitudes.
 Some French commentators argue that it would be unwise
 for France to express a willingness to host any U.S. military
 presence, however small, as this would encourage certain
 political forces in Germany to seek an exit from such respon
 sibilities. The net effect would thus be a weakening of the
 Atlantic alliance. By the same token, French officials contend
 that any neutralization of Germany must be avoided and that
 France and its nato partners must retain as much influence as
 possible in German affairs. The announced intention to with
 draw all French forces from Germany could contradict this
 aim, however, and undermine prospects for retaining a sub
 stantial U.S. military presence in the new Germany.
 A significant foreign military presence consisting of Euro
 pean troops?say, German, Dutch or British?might be more
 acceptable to the French than U.S. forces. But even specula
 tion about an increased German military presence?e.g., a
 brigade or Luftwaffe wing?has been very tentative because of
 concerns about possibly arousing domestic sensitivities. Such a
 deployment, however, could demonstrate West European
 unity or Franco-German solidarity. It might also make possible
 a continued French military presence in Germany. Indeed,
 some observers speculate that Mitterrand's July 1990 an
 nouncement that "logic" will require French forces in Ger
 many to return home, once Four Power roles are terminated
 and Soviet forces withdrawn, may have been intended to
 anticipate and politically preempt any German demands that
 French forces leave, or to prepare the ground for discussion of
 a possible Franco-German cross-stationing accord.
 Various proposals since early 1990, mostly from commen
 tators in Britain, Germany and the United States, that France
 return to nato's integrated military structure have been met
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 with the standard French responses. Mitterrand, for example,
 reaffirmed in July that France has "no intention of changing"
 its "particular position with regard to nato's integrated com
 mand and its strategy." Some French commentators add that
 nato's integrated military structure is destined to atrophy, if
 not disappear entirely, in Europe's new circumstances. Others
 contend that nato's elaborate structure is now unnecessary
 anyway, given the increase in warning time before any Soviet
 aggression.
 French reservations about the integrated military structure
 extend to nato's July 1990 decision to "rely increasingly on
 multinational corps made up of national units." Britain, Ger
 many, the United States and other allies see multinational
 corps as politically useful because they may make a continued
 foreign military presence more acceptable to the public in
 Germany and other host countries. In contrast, French offi
 cials see multinational units under the Supreme Allied Com
 mander in Europe as not only operationally problematic but
 also politically undesirable. Such a structure, they fear, could
 perpetuate and perhaps even deepen integration under U.S.
 authority, postponing what many French officials see as a
 necessary and overdue adjustment in European-American
 leadership responsibilities. In their view, nato's integrated
 command is anachronistic and tends to exclude France and to
 undermine West European defense cooperation efforts. At the
 same time, whenever the "French model"?withdrawal from
 nato's integrated structure in order to pursue a more inde
 pendent course?is advanced as a possible option for Ger
 many, the French typically react with annoyance.
 VII
 At the July 1990 nato summit in London, Mitterrand made
 it clear that "France does not share the strategic conceptions of
 the alliance, neither those of yesterday, nor those of today:
 those of yesterday concerning flexible defense, the forward
 battle; those of today on nuclear weapons as a last resort. . . .
 We do not share any of that. . . . Deterrence is intended to
 prevent war, to forbid it, and not to win it." Chev?nement also
 rejected the "last resort" approach to nuclear weapons employ
 ment as "poles apart from a well-understood strategy of
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 deterrence, in the interests of Europeans."7
 For political reasons French leaders remain interested in
 emphasizing that their nuclear strategy and employment pol
 icy are not in any way a subset of nato strategy and policy.
 France's nuclear strategy, they say, is intended for deterrence
 and foresees only a limited and prompt "ultimate warning"
 employment of "prestrategic" nuclear weapons. This is con
 trasted with nato's strategy of flexible response, which they
 define, rather misleadingly, as oriented toward large-scale
 nuclear employment in Europe in order to achieve victory on
 the battlefield. Current French criticisms of nato's new "last
 resort" formula are reminiscent of France's reactions in the
 1960s to flexible response: that is, America is accused of trying
 to postpone the use of nuclear weapons until Europe has
 already been devastated by conventional war; whereas the
 threat of an earlier nuclear response might prevent war
 altogether.
 In fact, U.S. and nato policy has always been oriented
 toward war-prevention, and for over two decades the key
 concepts have been crisis management and a prompt "resto
 ration of deterrence" if selective and limited nuclear weapons
 employment ever became necessary to stop aggression and
 end the war. Neither the newness of the "last resort" approach
 nor its distance from the French strategic policy should be
 exaggerated. Noteworthy differences include the French insis
 tence on threatening prompt nuclear employment and the
 French judgment that (as France's preferred term implies)
 "prestrategic" retaliation should be clearly linked to the pros
 pect of imminent strategic nuclear strikes.
 One of the central questions in building a West European
 defense identity is how to provide nuclear protection for
 Germany. Since the French consider nuclear deterrence the
 most reliable means of war-prevention, it seems imperative to
 preclude any situation that would make Germany vulnerable
 to Soviet nuclear coercion, or preoccupied with an apparent
 lack of nuclear protection. Partly to ensure against any future
 German interest in developing an autonomous nuclear weap
 ons program, some French officials and commentators have
 suggested that a mechanism be found to reaffirm the strategic
 solidarity of Britain, France and Germany, perhaps a Euro
 7 Mitterrand press conference of July 6, 1990, in Le Monde, July 8-9, 1990, p. 5, and
 Chev?nement interview, op. cit.
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 pean nuclear consultation arrangement. Chev?nement consid
 ers a West European defense partnership offering nuclear
 protection to Germany the only choice, given what he defines
 as the alternatives: "An American protection that risks seem
 ing more and more uncertain? Or Germany's choice to assure
 her security by herself?"
 France's reasoning behind the concern for Germany's nu
 clear protection was set forth most clearly in March 1990 by
 Andr? Giraud, Minister of Defense during the French gov
 ernment's 1986?88 period of cohabitation. Giraud wrote:
 To assure deterrence in Europe and protect Germany from a conventional
 attack, nuclear weapons must be stationed in Germany, which, by their
 mobility and range, assure its sanctuarization in satisfactory conditions. To
 be sure, these nuclear weapons cannot be German. They can be American
 and/or European. But it would be normal for the Germans to have a veto
 right regarding their employment, the threat of which must not be
 implemented unless vital interests are threatened. It is in the solution to
 this problem that there resides the decisive key to the construction of a
 European defense.8
 Despite the uncertainties about the reliability of U.S. nuclear
 guarantees that French governments have underlined since the
 1960s, Chev?nement has also argued that Germany's "future
 security against aggression must be assured first of all by the joint
 and solemn commitment of the three nuclear powers": Britain,
 France and the United States. In the future, he sees the Euro
 pean nuclear forces making "a decisive contribution to the
 security of their partners and notably the F.R.G." But the
 implementation of this concept presents several problems.
 First, there is France's continuing interest in delineating its
 nuclear strategy as separate from that of nato and, particu
 larly, the United States. Because France cannot "renounce the
 independence of our defense," as Chev?nement has said, it is
 essential to "find, between Europeans, a framework flexible
 enough to provide for both the necessary consultation and the
 inevitable uniqueness of the nuclear decision."
 A second uncertainty is whether Britain would be interested
 in devising such an arrangement. Chev?nement has sometimes
 expressed concern that Britain continues to "give greater
 importance to her role of influence within the American
 power system." Some French observers attribute the delays
 8 "Europe et d?fense," Le Monde, March 21, 1990, p. 2.
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 and apparent impasses in the dialogue about possible Franco
 British development of an air-launched nuclear missile to
 Britain's desire to protect its special nuclear links with the
 United States.
 The most significant uncertainty, however, is whether the
 new Germany will accept any nuclear weapons presence at all.
 Some French commentators have expressed concern that the
 July 16, 1990, Kohl-Gorbachev agreement could be inter
 preted to rule out German participation in a joint West
 European nuclear deterrence arrangement. But Dumas has
 insisted that the German-Soviet accord does not provide for
 Germany's denuclearization, in the sense of forbidding the
 presence of foreign nuclear weapons. Lack of German interest
 could nonetheless preclude the establishment of any joint
 nuclear arrangement. Although some question whether a
 nuclear weapons presence is necessary for credible nuclear
 protection, others deem it absolutely indispensable. Giraud
 has argued as follows: "If, as certain of her politicians desire,
 Germany is to be denuclearized, that means that she is not
 ready to take the risks inherent in her own defense, and no
 one can defend her if she will not do so [personne ne peut la
 d?fendre ? sa place]. There will not be any [unified Western]
 Europe in this case."
 VIII
 Contradictions in French policy regarding the Atlantic alli
 ance and the maintenance of a U.S. military presence in
 Europe are also evident. The French want a U.S. military and
 nuclear presence in Europe, but not on their soil. They want a
 united Germany to be in nato?to avoid a "strategic vacuum"
 in central Europe, and to minimize the risk of Germany
 seeking neutrality, a special security relationship with Russia
 or security through its own means. Yet the French oppose the
 multinational corps approach that could be of great political
 utility in keeping American and allied troops in Germany, and
 they place greater emphasis on bilateral cooperation vehicles
 and exclusively European institutions than on renovating the
 Atlantic alliance.
 It would seem, however, that undertaking more responsi
 bilities on a bilateral basis or in European-only forums could
 weaken the nato framework that legitimizes the U.S. presence
 that France wishes to retain?to anchor Germany in the West,
 to balance German political influence in Europe and to pro
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 vide a military counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Some
 French policy articulations have failed to recognize that nato
 enjoys considerable legitimacy among U.S. and allied political
 leaders, and that nato remains, for the foreseeable future, the
 essential framework for the retention of U.S. forces in Europe
 and U.S. security commitments, including nuclear guarantees.
 Related inconsistencies in French policy regarding West
 European defense cooperation are apparent as well. While
 French politicians champion the concept of such cooperation,
 it is not clear that they are really prepared to give up national
 decision-making autonomy and the nuclear sanctuary and
 stronghold (le donjon nucl?aire, as it is sometimes called). They
 sometimes appear reluctant to work out operational defense
 plans and deployments on the basis of full equality and
 reciprocity with the Germans, without asserting that France is
 entitled to special status and freedom of decision. To many,
 France's attitude on a practical level seems to contradict its
 stated interest in deepening European political integration
 and, indeed, the ec's goal of political union.
 France's fundamental ambivalence about Germany remains
 unresolved. Distrust of future German security choices coex
 ists with a determination to align France with German eco
 nomic strength and promote Franco-German leadership in
 European construction. While some French analysts worry
 that the Germans will lose interest in maintaining Franco
 German relations as the motor of the ec, others are concerned
 about possible German dominance of the ec. Philippe Moreau
 Defarges judges that there is "hardly a chance" for the
 "constitution of a European defense" on the basis of the ec,
 owing to German unity. The Paris-Bonn team was the motor
 of European construction, he writes, because it rested on "a
 federal Germany less equal' than France, the first remaining
 under surveillance, the second constantly reaffirming its free
 dom of choice. With the unification of Germany, nothing will
 be as it was before."9
 The unresolved inconsistencies and uncertainties about
 France's future role in Europe's political and security institu
 tions reflect internal divisions. Some French analysts hold that
 the fundamental choice facing the nation is that between
 pursuing a narrowly national, essentially inward-looking pol
 9 "L'unification communautaire et les bouleversements du paysage europ?en," Politique
 Etrang?re, Spring 1990, pp. 147-148.
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 icy based on France's traditional nuclear deterrence posture,
 or trying to take a leading role in recasting the European
 political and security order through deeper cooperation with
 allies in Europe and the Atlantic community as a whole. The
 latter course, particularly the idea of emphasizing Franco
 German cooperation to deepen economic and political inte
 gration in the ec, is seen by most politicians and experts as the
 more far-sighted choice. It is sometimes called "Euro
 voluntarism," and broadly speaking it is supported by politi
 cians as different as Fran?ois Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac and
 Val?ry Giscard d'Estaing.
 It appears at first glance that Mitterrand has followed the
 "Euro-voluntarist" course in various ways. He has overcome
 apparent earlier hesitations to emphasize close political and
 economic cooperation with Germany in support of ec objec
 tives, and he has taken several initiatives for positive political
 and economic change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
 Mitterrand's critics argue, however, that his approach to
 cooperation with Germany still remains too hesitant, too
 equivocal and too tempered with a concern for maintaining
 good relations with Moscow. They charge that nothing specific
 has been proposed to build up a West European defense
 identity, that too much emphasis has been placed on France's
 unique status, and that nuclear forces for protection of the
 national "sanctuary" have been favored at the expense of the
 conventional forces needed to make a more effective contri
 bution to the constitution of a European defense entity.
 Gaullist leader Jacques Chirac and other members of the
 opposition, including many in the Giscardian Union pour la
 D?mocratie Fran?aise, have championed more effective and
 ambitious West European defense cooperation as a means to
 strengthen the Atlantic alliance. Paradoxically, some of the
 Gaullists seem more prepared than the Socialists to circum
 scribe France's autonomy in order to build a more reliable
 Western military posture. Opposition spokesmen generally
 express more wariness than the Socialist government regard
 ing the prospects for a peaceful and positive evolution of
 Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and thus more interest
 in Western and, specifically, West European defense cooper
 ation. Some critics of the government warn that excessive and
 maladroit insistence on autonomy could lead to France's
 isolation and undermine Franco-German relations. Over
 emphasis on the long-term goal of a "more European" Eu
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 rope, on the other hand, could undermine French and Euro
 pean security by weakening ties with the United States.
 There is, of course, no guarantee of success in the "Euro
 voluntarist" course, even if the French pursued it with great
 cohesion and consistency. Its prospects depend heavily on
 France's partners, and above all, Germany. A nationalistic
 reaction against "Euro-voluntarism" could occur at some point
 if such policies seemed to imply a subordination of France to
 Germany and/or the United States. A similar reaction could
 take place if certain supranational features of the ec's political
 union seemed to threaten France's national identity and deci
 sion-making autonomy.
 The opposite of the "Euro-voluntarist" course is France's
 traditional nuclear sanctuary policy, which is in some ways the
 path of least resistance. Many French politicians and commen
 tators have asserted that the developments of the past year
 have vindicated France's reliance on nuclear deterrence to
 protect the national sanctuary. No policy changes are neces
 sary, it is argued, for France's nuclear posture will continue to
 shelter the nation's security and independence from all fore
 seeable challenges. A greater emphasis on autonomy through
 nuclear deterrence could permit larger cuts in conventional
 military programs and satisfy those in the Socialist Party eager
 to cut defense spending to finance social programs. National
 nuclear autonomy also avoids the divisive controversies and
 agonizing reappraisals that could be associated with qualifying
 France's independence and recognizing more explicitly its
 dependence on allies.
 The fear of German domination of European institutions
 may explain part of the attraction, at least in some circles, of a
 more nationalistic course for France. The appeal could also be
 reinforced by unhappiness over supranational trends in the
 ec, owing to the perception that France is surrendering its
 sovereignty and losing control over its own borders. Some link
 such sentiments to France's current problems with immigra
 tion and racism, its concern about a potential crisis of national
 identity, and fears that France has lost its special mission as the
 light of civilization, considered by many of the French as their
 nation's exceptional rayonnement. Although the conviction that
 France has a unique political and ideological vision, a special
 status and purpose in the world, has had many positive
 by-products over the centuries, it could contribute to the risk
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 of France withdrawing to a posture of relying on itself alone,
 la France seule.
 A logical long-term extrapolation of a more nationalistic
 French course could involve nuclear-armed neutrality, per
 haps even supplemented by an anti-German alliance with the
 Soviets. Virtually everyone who alludes to a possible Franco
 Soviet alliance deplores it as unwise and self-defeating, but it
 has been mentioned relatively frequently, and this has perhaps
 contributed to the recent troubles in France's relations with
 Germany. Fran?ois de Rose has asked, for example, "Doesn't
 our European policy require that we discard the shadow of a
 suspicion, however ill-founded, that we might reserve the
 option of a return to the policy of switching alliances?"10 Some
 French analysts have pointed out that the Soviets could use the
 notion to separate Germany from France, and theu choose
 Germany themselves; Germany is intrinsically more valuable
 to Moscow than is France. De Rose and others have also
 warned that a failure to participate in the recasting of the
 Western alliance would simply mean that solutions would be
 found without France, and that France's self-isolation would
 mean Germany's military and political weight in central Eu
 rope and the U.S.S.R. would be even greater.
 "Euro-pessimists" judge that, if Germany loses interest in
 the ec, the Franco-German partnership and the Atlantic
 alliance, France might have no choice but to rely more on its
 own resources and to strengthen its ties with Britain and
 America. Such an argument for closer ties with the "Anglo
 Saxons" has been advanced by Edouard Balladur, the Gaullist
 minister of economy and finances during the cohabitation
 government. Similarly, some speculate that France might
 become more receptive to stationing U.S. forces in certain
 circumstances?e.g., a future German government abruptly
 expelling U.S. troops, an assumption of power by the Soviet
 military leadership and/or the adoption of more obviously
 threatening policies by Moscow.
 IX
 Extreme scenarios appear far less probable at the present
 juncture than an uncomfortable compromise between "Euro
 voluntarism" and efforts to maintain the specificity of France's
 10 "La crise des strat?gies," D?fense Nationale, May 1990, p. 70.
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 autonomous security policies. A compromise course may have
 the advantage of preserving the consensus on the Gaullist
 model in the intermediate term, and perhaps even longer,
 depending on the course of events. Retaining at least part of
 the Gaullist model is a political imperative, as it provides a
 satisfactory national self-image of rank and autonomy, and
 promises to hold France aloof from war. This approach to
 security has been, particularly since the late 1970s, a source of
 cohesion in a society that has historically been polarized on
 political matters, including national security policy. This prag
 matic approach of hedging and balancing, with a continuing
 admixture of Gaullist rhetoric about France's rank and inde
 pendent nuclear strategy, is politically more sustainable than a
 course that appears to allow French policy to be overly
 influenced by its security environment.
 This compromise approach nonetheless entails notable
 risks. Three internal challenges to the defense consensus could
 be especially significant.
 First, the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence policies could be
 challenged more profoundly than in the past. Environmental
 concerns raised by an increasingly successful Green political
 movement, les Verts, are becoming more prominent, owing in
 part to greater public awareness of nuclear reactor safety
 questions and unresolved problems of nuclear waste disposal.
 On the other hand, despite signs of official concern about the
 potential fragility of the national consensus behind nuclear
 deterrence, antinuclear movements and sentiments remain
 markedly less significant in France than in Britain, Germany
 or the United States. Powerful countervailing political incen
 tives may tend to reinforce the legitimacy of France's nuclear
 deterrent policies, particularly in an era characterized by
 greater fluidity in international political alignments and more
 extensive proliferation of nuclear weapons.
 Second, questions about immigration and racism, particu
 larly with respect to the large and growing numbers of North
 Africans and other Muslims in France, loom larger in day-to
 day French politics than do questions about Germany and
 European security arrangements. The immigration question
 poses profound challenges to France's social cohesion and
 domestic consensus. An awkward overlap with defense issues
 could arise because of the "third circle," as some of France's
 internal political contention during the current crisis in the
 Persian Gulf suggests. Some French observers are concerned
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 that international conflicts such as the gulf crisis and Islamic
 fundamentalism in North Africa and other areas could lead to
 a radicalization of the substantial Muslim minority in France,
 and possibly to civil strife or terrorism.
 Finally, a perceived loss of national military-industrial au
 tonomy could also affect the French defense consensus. De
 clining arms exports, the rising costs of modern weapons and
 other practical considerations may encourage France to coop
 erate much more with allies in equipment production and
 procurement in the future. Such pressures are likely to be
 accentuated by France's need to replace large categories of
 conventional equipment in the 1990s, owing to the obsoles
 cence of its tanks, tactical aircraft, surface ships and other
 weapons systems. Limited defense resources, in view of the
 splits in the Socialist Party over budgetary priorities and
 pressing social welfare demands, may also point toward
 greater French cooperation with allies.
 If French governments can overcome such challenges to the
 defense consensus, they may be able to maintain a compromise
 course. It will, however, undoubtedly be harder for France to
 sustain the policy guidelines and ambiguities of the past.
 Future governments are nonetheless likely to strive to retain as
 much of the Gaullist attitude as possible, even if the substance
 of their policies eventually contains less and less of the ap
 proach de Gaulle bequeathed them. The profound reluctance
 to change France's basic security policies is rooted in their past
 success and inherent attractiveness; these policies have permit
 ted France great autonomy and a special international status,
 as well as security. Recognizing that the success of these
 policies has depended to a large extent on a particular set of
 international circumstances implies a painful adjustment for a
 country that prides itself on its rank and independence.
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